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Abstract: In this article we seek, firstly, to elucidate how Machado de Assis developed the conception of the 
unconscious in the novel Helena (1876) and in the short story Uma senhora (1883). Secondly, we examine how 
his conception of unconscious can be elucidated phenomenologically, from the relation between reflective and 
pre-reflective awareness. In these narratives, Machado reveals how certain emotions, although not reflectively 
apprehended by the subject who lives them, manifest indirectly in actions, in body expressions and in the 
understanding of the world.
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The presence of the unconscious concept 
in the text and context of Machado de Assis 
It is not new among his critics that Machado de 
Assis was deeply interested in psychiatry and in the 
romantic philosophy of the nineteenth century. This 
can be seen, for example, in the various psychiatry 
titles in his personal library (Jobim, 2001), among 
which we can find works by prominent psychiatrists, 
such as Théodule-Armand Ribot (1839-1916), Henry 
Maudsley (1835-1918), Marie Charles Joseph Bra (1854-
1912). Machado portrayed throughout many short stories 
and novels the most varied psychic phenomena, such as 
delusions, dreams, obsessions, hallucinations (Lopes, 
1981), besides examining passions, such as vanity, envy, 
love, hatred, remorse, jealousy, etc. As if that was not 
enough, his fictional universe is populated by a varied 
typology, relying on sadists, mentally insane, obsessives, 
narcissists and even psychopaths (Freitas, 2001, Lopes, 
1981). Machado himself was a psychiatric affair, having, 
as Dostoevsky, the disease of the gods, epilepsy, which 
brought him extreme experiences of consciousness 
(Junior, 1938). All this, in addition to his vast literary and 
philosophical culture, contributed Machado to achieving 
an elaborate conception of psychic life, a concept that he 
improves throughout his literary career.
This interest for psychology and psychiatry 
was not, however, his privilege. In the second half 
of the nineteenth century, psychology occupies more 
and more space not only in European life, but also in 
Brazilian life, especially in the urban middle class, 
as can be seen in the growing space of psychology 
sections in newspapers and magazines of that time 
(Massimi, 1990). Moreover, the romantic movement 
of the nineteenth century has as one of its features the 
tendency to explore the obscure side and the irrational 
forces of the individual (Ellenberger, 1991).
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There are currently studies that show how 
Machado, throughout his works, elaborated a complex 
conception of unconscious1 (Barbieri, 1998, Freitas, 
2001, Leite, 2002, Peres & Massimi, 2004, Peres, 
2016). As far as the problem of the unconscious is 
concerned, one of the most quoted and analyzed short 
stories is O cônego ou metafísica do estilo, of 1885 
(Peres & Massimi, 2004, Peres 2016, Barbieri, 2001). 
In this short story, the narrator presents the pompous 
and playful theory, according to which the source of 
poetic inspiration occurs in the unconscious. There are 
extremely rich passages, such as:
Now, however, the path is dark. We pass from 
consciousness to unconsciousness, where the 
confused elaboration of ideas takes place, where 
the reminiscences sleep or doze off. Here, life leaps 
without shapes, germs and debris, rudiments and 
sediments; it is the immense depth of the spirit. 
(Assis, 2004a, p. 275)
As Barbieri (1998) shows, this story was inspired 
on the Eduard von Hartmann’s work, Philosophy of the 
Unconscious, from 1877. In the collection of the Machado 
de Assis Library, we find it in the French translation of 1881 
(Jobim, 2001) There are several indications that Machado 
read it in the mid-1880s Note that Hartmann’s (1877) work 
was widely debated at the end of the nineteenth century, 
and then fell into oblivion Nevertheless, it presents some 
rather interesting and provocative ideas, such as that the 
1 Note that Schwarz (1997), in his classic study A master on the periphery 
of capitalism, did not fail to be sensitive to the theme of the unconscious in 
the work of Machado de Assis. For him (p. 89, 1997), Machado “married 
new themes from the European philosophy of the unconscious with the 
historical position of the Brazilian elite.” However, Schwarz does not offer 
a systematic treatment of the theme of the unconscious. On this occasion, 
we seek to explicit the conception of Machado and show that it can be 
interpreted according to Phenomenology. We must mention, however, that 
this “marriage” between the situation of the Brazilian elite and the theme of 
the unconscious proves to be an interesting path to be explored.
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unconscious is distinguished on three levels: individual, 
social and cosmic (Hartmann, 1877).
Although Hartmann’s work is, as far as the 
conception of the unconscious is concerned, a clear 
inspiration for Machado, his interest did not begin with 
reading the work of the German philosopher. Already in 
his second novel, Helena, of 1876, Machado worked on 
the conception that the human being is influenced by a 
dimension that escapes consciousness. In this work we 
find Estácio, a young man who is gradually falling in 
love, unaware, by his beautiful bastard sister, Helena. 
As I hope to show in the analyzes that will follow, even 
if unconscious, this feeling is growing and manifesting 
indirectly in various ways. Machado even uses the 
expression “unconscious” to preach Estácio’s love. It is 
a passage in which one of the characters of the novel, 
Father Melchior, says to the boy: “Your heart is a great 
unconscious” (2004a, p. 363).
In addition to the factors already mentioned, 
there are others that explain why Machado anticipated 
and elaborated a rich conception of the unconscious 
even before the publication of Freud’s Interpretation of 
Dreams (1980). Machado, as Freud,2 was an avid reader of 
Schopenhauer, whose notion of will can be understood as 
a cosmic force that escapes the full consciousness of the 
individual (Ellenberger, 1991). Machado was an admirer 
of Allan Poe and shared with him his love for the dark 
side of human nature. He knew the works of Darwin, 
with whom he learned to distrust human rationality 
and pay attention to the strategies of the instincts. With 
Pascal (2004, pp. 127-128), he had learned that “the 
heart has reasons that reason does not know”. French 
moralists of the sixteenth century had already devalued 
the strategies of self-love and the inclination to self-
deception (Vauvenargues, 1998). In the same vein, the 
Brazilian Matias Aires, in 1752, in his Reflections on 
the Vanity of Men (1942), examined point-by-point the 
wit of vanity which, according to the author, is a passion 
that often acts from the underground:
Of all the passions, the most hidden one is vanity: 
and it hides itself in such a way that almost 
2 In many ways, although we are proposing a phenomenological 
interpretation that aims to understand the description of Machado’s 
idea of consciousness versus unconsciousness through the pre-reflective 
self-awareness key versus reflective self-awareness, we should note that 
the way Machado describes consciousness anticipates, in some aspects, 
the distinctions made by Freud, in the first topic, between unconscious, 
preconscious and conscious. There are, however, certain limitations of 
approximation. According to Zahavi (1999), Freud operates with the 
concept of consciousness from the reflective model of self-awareness. 
That is, for Freud, a psychic process is conscious as far as it is the object 
of attention. Gomes (2003, p. 123) follows in the same thought, saying 
that, for Freud, “Becoming conscious, for a representation, means, 
therefore, to be noticed by this system where the excitations occur in 
a fleeting way and without leaving trace. Among the preconscious 
representations, only a few are chosen by the attention, at every moment, 
to become conscious.” Due to the focus of this article, we only indicate 
such aspects, since a detailed discussion of this promising theme would 
require an extensive investigative effort.
disappears, and ignores it: even the most pious 
actions are often born of a mystical vanity, which, 
the one who has it, does not know it and does not 
distinguish it: the self-satisfaction the soul receives 
is the same as a looking-glass in which we see 
ourselves as superior to other men for the good we 
do, and in this is the vanity of doing good. (Aires, 
1993, p. 35)
The heart is a great unconscious
In the novel Helena, published in 1876, we 
find for the first time, more clearly, the presence of a 
conception of the unconscious in the work of Machado 
de Assis. The story begins with the death of a wealthy 
widower, Counselor Vale, who leaves to his son Estácio 
a wealthy inheritance. The will, however, brings a 
surprising confession. In it, Counselor Vale claims to 
have a bastard daughter, Helena, to whom he had secretly 
supported throughout his life and to whom his family 
should welcome once he was dead.
Estácio and his aunt, Mrs. Ursula, even though 
afraid, end up fulfilling his father’s wish; they receive the 
new member of the family full of suspicion and distrust. 
But Helen, with great skill and a generous heart, gradually 
make herself welcome in the house. Sometime later, 
Estácio is already in great affection for his new sister, 
having her as a friend and confidant, and even a little 
more.
A few months later, a friend of Estácio’s, 
Mendonça, returns from Europe. After some visits to 
his friend’s house, he sees in Helena a possible wife 
and starts to court her. The girl returns with affection. 
Noticing the romance mood, the family’s priest, Melchior, 
plans to marry them as soon as possible. He consults the 
girl first and finds out that she approves the marriage. 
Shortly after, alone with Helena and Mendonça, the 
priest anticipates the young man and declares that he 
would like to marry them. Their approval is immediate. 
Mendonça then sends Estácio a message on the following 
day announcing his wish to marry Helena and asking 
for his consent. Estácio, however, took a dim view of the 
proposal. He decides to question his sister to see if she 
really wants to marry Mendonça, to which she says yes. 
Despite the affirmative answer, Estácio realizes that he 
can not accept the marriage, because she had confessed 
to him, a while before, to have another love. Helena does 
not accept the argument and seeks to persuade Estácio 
to accept the marriage to Mendonça, but in vain.
After failing to reach an agreement with Helena, 
Estácio resolves, in order to clarify his ideas, to consult 
Father Melchior on the subject. To his disappointment, 
the priest also stands in favor of the marriage. Estácio 
is still not happy with it and begins to argue with the 
priest, struggling to find arguments against marriage. In 
the meantime, Mendonça appears and Estácio does not 
hesitate to strongly and injuriously express his opposition 
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to the marriage. Tempers flare, Mendonça reacts, and the 
friends fight. On the next day, Estácio decides to talk 
again with his sister, who remains firm in her resolution 
and asks him to make amends with Mendonça. Estácio 
finally gives in and goes to visit his friend.
Mendonça forgives him, but still Estácio can 
not accept the marriage. What he does not know is that 
he loves his own sister, which the priest had already 
realized. In chapter XXIII, in one of the climaxes of 
the novel, the priest reveals to Estácio the love he feels 
for Helena, but still does not know it exists. Before 
exposing what he already knows, Melchior asks Estácio 
two questions, in order to prepare him for the emotional 
charge of the revelation of his incestuous love: “Are 
you strong?” and “Do you believe in God?” Estácio, 
suspicious, answers yes.
First, the priest exposes a whole theory about the 
unconscious. In fact, his explanations about the way the 
unconscious acts are very long and meticulous. This is 
possibly explained by the fact that Machado knew, in 1876, 
that he should convince the reader of the existence of such 
phenomenon. The priest begins his speech associating 
the heart with a “great unconscious”:
“Well, you transgressed the divine law, as well as 
the human law, without knowing it. Your heart 
is a great unconscious; it stirs, murmurs, rebels, 
wanders into a misexpressed and misunderstood 
instinct. Evil pursues you, tempts you, evolves you 
in its golden and hidden bonds; you do not feel 
it, you do not see it; you will be disgusted with 
yourself when you face him. God, who reads you, 
knows perfectly well that between your heart and 
your conscience there is a thick veil that separates 
them, that prevents this agreement that generates 
crime.
‘But what is it, Father-Master?’
Melchior leaned forward and stared at the young 
man. His eyes, fixed on him, were like a polished 
and cold mirror, designed to reproduce the image of 
what he was going to say.
‘Estácio,’ said Melchior, slowly, ‘you love your 
sister.’ (2004a, p. 363).”
If we consider that this novel was published in 
1876, when the novelist had not yet read Hartmann’s 
Philosophy of the Unconscious, this passage of the book 
is surprising, either by precision or by the richness to 
which the phenomenon is described. The way the priest 
confirms his hypothesis, that is, by the expressions of the 
boy, is remarkable: “The gesture mingled with horror, 
astonishment, and remorse with which Estácio had 
heard this word, showed the priest not only that he was 
right, but also that he had just revealed it to the young 
man” (2004a, 364). Although Estácio’s conscience repels 
the priest’s words, his body admits them, which makes it 
clear that the body is the privileged place of expression 
of the unconscious.
Estácio’s difficulty in facing feelings that remained 
in his unconscious continues to be explained in the 
following paragraphs, in which the narrator explains 
the boy’s reactions to the revelation, as can be seen in 
the following passage:
What his conscience ignored, his heart knew, and I 
only told him at that solemn hour. Consciousness, 
after groping in the darkness, drew back in terror, 
as if keeping away from itself the sudden glare that 
the priest’s word had lit in it. Estácio did not answer; 
he could not answer anything. With what word and 
in what human language could he express the new 
and terrible commotion that had shaken his whole 
soul? What thread could tie him to the broken and 
scattered ideas? He did not speak, nor dare to raise 
his eyes; he looked stupid and dead. (2004a, p. 364).
Even after the initial shock, Estácio continues to 
resist before the revelation, rejecting it with vague and 
disjointed words, from which “it could be concluded 
that he does not believe in Melchior’s revelation, that 
the supposed feeling was so absurd and unnatural that it 
should only should be attributed to bad instincts” (2004a, 
p. 364).
The priest, after listening to Estácio, takes up the 
word again, correcting him: “Bad instincts, no, replied 
Melchior; nor deviation from social and religious law, but 
unconscious deviation. Enter into your heart, Estácio; look 
in the most intimate places, and there you will find this 
baleful germ” (2004a, p. 364). Then the priest explains 
to Estácio how the feeling appeared in him. The main 
problem laid in the fact that when he first met Helena3, 
she already had “all the seductions of a woman” (2004a, 
p. 364), without him having “the image of her childhood 
and the communion of the first years” (2004a, p. 364). 
Little by little, Estácio gets used to the priest’s words until 
the obscure finally becomes transparent (2004a, p. 366).
Estácio’s love for Helena, as the priest revealed, 
was born without the boy noticing. However, although 
unconsciously, it does not fail to influence him in all sorts 
of ways – we can note it when Estácio tries to persuade 
himself that his friend is not a good candidate for marriage, 
or his excessive preoccupations with Helena. See the 
excessive jealousy he feels: one afternoon, watching her 
through a window crack, he finds her reading a letter. 
The idea that the letter could be loving “upset him a lot”:
Estácio was moved with grand curiosity, to which 
a shadow of spite and jealousy was mingling. The 
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idea that Helena could share her heart with someone 
else was disconcerting and irritating him at the 
same time. He could not explain the reason for such 
exclusive interest, nor did he try to investigate it; he 
only felt the effects and stood there, not knowing 
what to do. (2004a, p. 306).
Curious to know the content of the correspondence, 
Estácio approaches the sister and asks her about the letter, 
to which she answers: “Do you want to read it?.” Estácio 
then “blushed and refused with a gesture” (2004a, p. 306). 
The reason for Estácio’s blush seems to be shame, which 
is intensified by his love for Helena, showing, once again, 
how the body manifests the unconscious. In another 
situation, when both are walking in the garden, Estácio 
asks Helena if she is thinking of love affairs:
Helena did not answer; she took his arm, and they 
followed silently for ten minutes. Arriving on a 
wooden bench, Estácio sat down; Helena stood 
before him. They looked at each other without 
uttering a word; but Estácio’s lip twitched two or 
three times as if hesitating about what he was going 
to say. Finally, the young man won.
– Helena, he said, you love.
The girl shivered and blushed; looked around her, 
frightened, and laid her hands on his shoulders. 
Did she give a thought on what she said after? It 
is doubtful; but the voice, which on this occasion 
seemed to concentrate all the melodies of the human 
word, slowly sighed:
– Very, very much!
Estácio paled. The girl stepped back and, trembling, 
put the finger to her own mouth, as if imposing 
silence. Shame flared in her face; Helena turned 
her back on her brother and hurried away. (2004a, 
p. 312).
The pallor, the glances, the trembling lips are 
signs that the love between them is already present in 
this scene. We can say that their bodies already love 
each other, although the presence of love has not yet 
penetrated into Estácio’s consciousness. In the case of 
Helena, she is supposed to have known of her love for 
Estácio, since she, throughout her time in the house, was 
aware that she was not the blood daughter of Estácio’s 
father, Counselor Vale. In the case of Estácio, love is 
experienced, but not understood.
Machado, in 1876, begins to delineate a 
sophisticated conception of the unconscious. It is not 
simply something that hides behind consciousness, but 
a type of consciousness that does not reveal itself. We 
can see that the feeling is “unconscious” not because 
it is not felt, but because it is, as the priest affirms, “a 
misexpressed and misunderstood feeling” (2004a, p. 363). 
Love is conscious as far as it is felt. But it is unconscious 
as far as it is “misexpressed and misunderstood.” In 
other words, love is felt on a conscious level, but this 
same love is not brought to consciousness by a process 
of conceptual explication in which loving experience 
becomes the subject of a reflective thinking.
It is clear, therefore, that we can interpret the 
concept of the unconscious from the articulation between 
two conceptions of consciousness: one in the strict sense 
and one in the broad sense.
In a strict sense, the feeling of love is unconscious 
since the protagonist is unaware of its presence. It is 
unconscious as far as it is not formulated in linguistic 
experiences that bring it to his understanding. That is, 
Estácio feels the effects of his love, but does not make 
it explicit for himself.
In a broad conception, however, the experience 
of love is conscious as far as it is felt by the subject. The 
feeling is one among other conscious experiences of the 
character. A feeling, as it is felt, cannot be unconscious. 
In this conception, there is no meaning to affirm the 
existence of an unconscious feeling. An unconscious 
pain, for example, is not a pain, it is just a physiological 
state. Pain is a form of conscious manifestation. This is 
revealed, for example, in psychiatric cases, such as when 
subjects feel pain in a phantom limb. Therefore, there 
is good reasons to assert that, when Machado speaks of 
an unconscious feeling, he is not referring to a feeling 
that is withdrawn from consciousness, but to a feeling 
that, although present, is not noticed, is not thematized 
and articulated conceptually by a reflective experience, 
as the passage shows: “He did not explain the reason 
for such exclusive interest (n.d.r: the feeling of love) or 
tried to investigate it” (2004a, p. 306). This situation is 
well expressed by the Danish philosopher Dan Zahavi 
(1999, p. 206):
Although I may not be unconscious of my present 
experience, I might very well ignore it in favor of 
its object, and this is of course the natural attitude. 
In my daily life I am absorbed by and preoccupied 
with projects and objects of the world. Thus, 
pervasive pre-reflective self-awareness is definitely 
not identical with total self-comprehension but can 
instead be likened to a pre-comprehension that 
allows for subsequent reflection and thematization.
This position is admittedly inspired by Husserlian 
phenomenology. In fact, Husserl (1984, p.355) 
distinguishes, as Zahavi (2002, 1999) points out, several 
concepts of consciousness, among which, for the purposes 
of this article, stand out: (1) intentional awareness, (2) pre-
reflective self-awareness, and (3) reflective self-awareness. 
These are three concepts that we will investigate in the 
next sections.
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Intentional awareness 
The term “awareness” refers here to the 
consciousness of something external to itself. In order 
to clarify this concept, we can base ourselves on the 
following analogy: Imagine that we are walking in 
a dark cave with the aid of a flashlight. As we walk 
through the cave, our intentional awareness is directed 
toward something transcendent, that is, towards the 
path, obstacles etc. In this case, we are not paying 
attention to the experience of seeing the way, but purely 
and simply on the way. There is a difference between 
paying attention on the way and paying attention to the 
experience of seeing the way. Most of the time, we are 
aware of objects, situations and projects relative to the 
world. This “awareness of something” is what Husserl 
calls “intentional experience.” It has several forms, that 
is, there are several types of intentional experience, 
such as imagining something, perceiving something, 
remembering something, doubting something.
Every experience is an event itself that occurs in 
awareness. That is, the flow of awareness is nothing more 
than a flow of experiences (Husserl, 1984, p. 355). One of 
the most important points of the intentional conception 
of awareness is that it breaks with the old notion that 
understands it as a closed box, full of internal contents. 
That is, we are not only aware of what is within our 
consciousness, but of what is outside of it, or rather, of 
what is transcendent to it (Sokolowski, 2004). With that, 
Husserl (1984) criticizes the representational theory of 
perception. For Husserlian phenomenology, if I see a 
rose, I do not see the representation of a rose, I see the 
rose itself.
Pre-reflective self-awareness  
Let us return to the previous example. As we 
walk through the cave, with our attention directed to 
the illuminated surface, we are also, in a sense, aware of 
our own hand, which holds and handles the flashlight, 
in order to control the focus of light. In this case, we 
are aware of the hand in a distinct way of how we are 
aware of the illuminated area. I am aware of my hand 
and its movements without giving them the privilege 
of my attention. That is, I have a pre-reflective self-
awareness of my hand. What characterizes the pre-
reflective awareness it is that, in it, the experience does 
not manifest itself as an object. At this moment, for 
example, I have several sensory experiences: thermal, 
auditory, movement (kinesthesia), etc. Such sensations 
are conscious, but they do not manifest themselves as 
objects. If I am simply occupied with seeing a table, I 
experience seeing it, it is part of the flow of awareness 
and, in this sense, it is conscious. However, it is a pre-
reflective experience that I have of the table. In short, 
as far as I am purely and simply oriented to the world, 
my experiences do not appear as opposed to me. I, so 
to speak, am immersed in my experiences, addressing 
myself to the world.4
Reflective self-awareness  
However, I can at any moment reflect about the 
experience in which I am immersed. As Husserl writes: 
“We realized directly, for example, the house and not 
the realization itself. It is only through reflection that 
we turn to the act itself and to its being perceptually 
directed towards the house” (Husserl, 1991, p. 72). In 
other words, in reflection, the flow of awareness ceases 
to go outward to directs to itself.
Reflective experiences constitute a certain class 
of experiences. Sometimes Husserl calls the reflexive 
experience “inner perception,” or “perception directed to 
immanence” (1952, p. 84). It is an experience that, instead 
of being directed to the outside world, it is directed to 
another experience. When this occurs, the experience 
on which we reflect, that is, the experience perceived 
reflexively, manifests itself as an object. “Natural 
reflection essentially changes the experience that was 
previously naive; it loses the original way of being 
immediately directed, precisely because reflection makes 
object what before was experience, but not something 
objective.” (1991, p. 72).
Let us return for a while to our example, in 
which we walk in the cave. Although, in general, our 
consciousness is directed towards the illuminated path, 
we can at any moment shift attention and explicitly focus 
on the hand that controls the flashlight. At that moment, 
the hand and its movements become a theme of which the 
mind engages. In this case, this would be equivalent to a 
move to use the flashlight to illuminate our own hand. 
But why would anyone do this reflexive movement? In 
many cases this movement just causes more problems 
than solutions. If I stop paying attention on the way to pay 
attention to the texture of the flashlight, its shape, etc., I 
run the risk of falling into some abyss. Circumstances call 
for my attention to be drawn to the immediate physical 
environment. My attention would only turn to my hand 
if it is not performing well, for example, if it is perspiring 
and the flashlight begins to slip between my fingers. 
It will drive my attention to the hand, for me to solve 
this problem, and wipe it. In other words, the reflexive 
attitude occurs only for vital reasons in rare moments.
In our natural attitude, we are immersed in experiences 
directly driven to the world, not just the immediate physical 
world, but the world as a whole, including the horizon of 
past and future (for example, when we plan something, we 
are directed to the future). For this reason, Husserl points 
4 This applies, in general, to sensory experiences. Sensations are 
components of perceptual experiences, but they are not noticed in 
perception. For this reason, Husserl writes: “I do not see color-sensations 
but colored things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer’s song” 
(2001, p. 99). Thus, through intentional experiences we are aware of 
something transcendent to the experience.
299
299
2018   I   volume 29   I   número 2    I   294-302
The phenomenology of the unconscious in the work of Machado de Assis
out that if there is reflexive movement, it is because there 
is some form of motivation, some internal requirement for 
the flow that makes it yield to itself.
In reflection, there is a thematic change, for in it 
we withdraw the focus of the world and direct it to our 
own experiences, which until then were experienced in 
a naive, pre-reflexive way. For example, in reflection, 
instead of thinking about how to do evil to the person 
I hate, I proceed to examine the experience of hatred I 
feel for it. In this case, I cease to thematize the person 
and how I can harm them, to thematize my own feeling. 
With reflection, I cease to act immersed in feeling, to 
alienate it from myself, to treat it as an object opposed 
to me and to observe it at a certain critical distance. Of 
course, this shift in focus does not occur randomly; it 
stems from a motivation. And what motivation takes 
the person to reflect? There can be many reasons. For 
example, a possible motive for thematizing hatred is 
self-determination, of moral character, of not allowing 
oneself to act in accordance with hatred.
Partial discussion  
Articulating these three forms of awareness 
to Estácio’s phenomenological understanding of the 
unconscious, we can say that he lives pre-reflexively the 
intentional experience of love for Helena. He is immersed 
in his loving experience, behaving towards the world as 
from it. The way he opens himself up significantly to 
the world and, particularly, to Helen is tacitly ruled by 
his loving experience. Although love is the source of 
motivation of several other experiences, such as jealousy, 
shame or sudden dislike for Mendonça, his love life 
remains unthematized. That is, Estácio does not distance 
himself from his own experience to examine it frontally, 
from a reflexive attitude. 
It is remarkable that Machado has, through Father 
Melchior’s words, shown that this reflexive self-qualm of 
the experience is linked to its expression and linguistic 
thematization. Reflection is a condition so that experience 
enters into the linguistic space of awareness, and can be 
explained, predicated and articulated comprehensively 
in the global context of life. Machado presents the 
idea that feeling is unconscious, as far as he, although 
alive pre-reflexively, remains unnoticed and linguistic-
conceptually inarticulate, remaining a “misexpressed and 
misunderstood” instinct (2004a, p. 363). It is the voice of 
the other, in this case Father Melchior, what pushes the 
reflexive attitude through in Estácio, so that he can no 
longer not see in himself the feeling of love.
Mrs. Camila: “a feeling is worth a reason”  
In the short story Uma senhora5, of 1883, Machado 
develops a conception of unconscious very similar to the 
5 The short story is in the volume Histórias sem data.
one present in the novel Helena. We could apply to the 
central character of the story, Mrs. Camila, the words that 
Father Melchior addressed to Estácio: “between your heart 
and your conscience there is something like a thick veil 
that separates them.” But in Uma senhora, what drives 
the behavior of the protagonist is not love, but vanity.
We find in this story Mrs. Camila, whose beauty 
did not go unnoticed and whose age did not match the 
luster of her faces. Her daughter, Ernestina, “had the 
freshness of years; but her mother’s beauty was more 
perfect, and despite the years, she surpassed that of her 
daughter” (2004b, p. 425). It does not prevent Mrs. Camila 
from feeling threatened when some boys begin to flirt 
with her daughter:
One day, a few months later, the first boyfriend came 
up. Mrs. Camila had vaguely thought of this calamity, 
without facing it, without preparing for the defense. 
When she least expected it, she found a suitor at the 
door. She questioned her daughter and discovered 
in her an indefinable uproar, the inclination of the 
twenties, and fell weak. Marrying her was the least, 
but if beings are as the waters of the Scripture, they 
do not return, because behind them come others, as 
behind waters there are more waters; and to define 
these successive waves is that men invented this name 
of grandchildren. Mrs. Camilla saw her imminent 
first grandson and was determined to postpone it. It 
is clear that she did not formulate the resolution, as 
she did not formulate the idea of the danger. The soul 
understands itself; a feeling is worth a thought. The 
ones she had were swift, dark, in the depths of her 
being, from where she had not extracted so she would 
not have to face them. (2004b, p. 425)
From the feeling of vanity comes the fear of 
old age. Becoming a grandmother is assuming her age 
before the world and herself. This is why she wanted to 
postpone the wedding. And we must note that this fear 
of becoming a grandmother, as well as the decision to 
disrupt and get in the way of her daughter’s marriage, is 
not explicitly formulated at the level of awareness: “It is 
clear that she did not formulate the resolution, as she had 
not formulated the idea of the danger.” (2004b, p. 425). 
However, despite not expressing the decision for herself, 
she acts and experiences the world in a way that delays 
her daughter’s marriage. That is, the determination to 
postpone marriage does not emerge in her consciousness 
as an idea or reasoning, but as sensations. In fact, Mrs. 
Camila does not approve any of her daughter’s boyfriends, 
always finding problems in them. She believes, however, 
that the real reason for the antipathy she feels for the 
young boys are their own fault, and not because of the 
possible matrimony consequences. That is, there is in Mrs. 
Camila a tendency to look for defects in her daughter’s 
suitors. But this inclination is not thematized or made 
explicit by her own conscience.
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What draws attention to this story is the complexity 
with which the veiled vanity acts in Mrs. Camila. Vanity is 
not limited to an instance that remains hidden, but involves 
something more elaborate, such as an underground 
intelligence. Moved to protect vanity, the soul is able to 
glimpse future possibilities and identify which of them 
are undesirable, strategically acting to avoid them. All 
this performance of the soul, however, does not take place 
on a conscious-reflective level. Therefore, if we say that 
the operations of the soul are unconscious, we should add 
that the unconscious is not blind to the world. It cannot 
be compared to a dark basement, in the underground of 
the soul. Note that Machado does not properly speak of 
an “unconscious” vanity: he rather uses the expression 
“the soul understands itself” (2004b, p. 425). That is, 
this pre-understanding that the soul has of itself occurs 
at a pre-reflective level.
We can say that in this short story the soul is 
presented as something that has, so to speak, layers. And 
not all of these layers are transparent to it. The narrator 
says that the sensations occur “in the most intimate of 
his being.” And the intimate of being is not transparent 
to the subject, is not given explicitly. These sensations 
are not thematized in order to become objects opposed 
to the self, as it is clear at the moment when the narrator 
says that Mrs. Camila “had not extract so she would not 
have to face them” (2004b, p. 425). In other words, the 
concept of soul, in a sense, involves both consciousness 
(in the strict sense) and unconsciousness (pre-reflective 
consciousness). Unconscious and conscious belong to 
the same whole, which is the soul.
The soul cannot be compared to an interiority nor 
to the conscious life because that is what gives life and 
moves the individual. Consciousness is a layer of the 
soul. And linguistic experiences constitute the highest 
form of this conscious layer. Thus, when the narrator 
states that “the soul understands itself,” he is not saying 
that this understanding occurs from conscious linguistic 
experiences, expressed in an “inner speech.” This is 
reinforced when the narrator says that “a feeling is worth a 
thought” (2004b, p. 425). And the feelings of Mrs. Camila 
defend her self-esteem, avoiding the grandchildren. Let 
us see in detail how Mrs. Camila avoids her daughter’s 
marriage.
Ribeiro, Ernestina’s first boyfriend, is about 
to receive a diplomatic post in the United States and, 
before leaving abroad, decides to ask his girlfriend 
to marry him. Mrs. Camila objected to the request, 
claiming that she did not want to be distant from her 
daughter. Another candidate emerges, a widower of 
twenty-seven years old. Mrs. Camila, at first, accepts 
the new suitor, but soon struggles to find any problems 
with the young man:
She could not allege anything against him; he had 
a nose as straight as the consciousness, and a deep 
dislike for diplomatic life. But there should be other 
defects, there must be others. Mrs. Camila looked 
for them deeply; asked him about his relationships, 
habits, past. She managed to find insignificant 
things, just a detail of human imperfection, 
alternatives of humor, lack of intellectual graces, 
and, finally a great excess of self-esteem. That was 
how the beautiful lady caught him. She began to 
slowly raise the wall of silence; first launched the 
layer of pauses, more or less long, then the short 
phrases, then the monosyllables, the distractions, 
the absorptions, the complacent looks, the resigned 
ears, the fake yawns behind the hand fan. He did not 
understand right away; but, when he noticed that the 
temper of the mother coincided with the daughter’s 
absences, thought it was there and retired. If he had 
been a man of struggle, he would had jumped the 
wall; but he was proud and weak. Mrs. Camila gave 
thanks to the gods. (2004b, p. 426)
Behind antipathies there may be hidden causes. 
Mrs. Camila believes that the reason she does not like 
her daughter’s boyfriends is their fault. Ironically, Mrs. 
Camila sees the “excess of self-esteem” as the biggest 
flaw of the second suitor. As we have seen, she is inclined 
to find defects in her daughter’s suitors. But she does not 
notice this inclination, as far as she does not explicitly 
assume it for herself. Her motivation is somewhat 
sordid since it is based on her own egoism and not on 
the happiness of her daughter. Mrs. Camila is afraid of 
becoming a grandmother and having to face the condition 
that time, always ruthless, imposed on her. Becoming a 
grandmother would be to assume her advanced age, for 
herself and for others, and this was something that her 
vanity was not willing to accept.
In Uma senhora, we have the outline of a psychic 
model in which some conscious feelings, such as antipathy 
and sympathy, are the consequence of unconscious 
factors, that is, of a vanity that is present and active 
at a pre-reflective level. This short story recollects a 
psychological structure analogous to that of the novel 
Helena, concerning the jealousy which Estácio felt for 
her. Just as Estácio, moved by his unconscious love, feels 
dislike for Helena’s suitor, also Mrs. Camila, moved 
by unconscious vanity, finds defects in her daughter’s 
suitors. Thus, what can be “unconscious,” in the sense 
of not being noticed by a reflective apprehension, are 
not only the experiences, but also the motivational links 
between experiences belonging to the same flow. As 
Husserl writes in Ideas II:
In this context, the singular experience is then 
motivated by a hidden background, it has “psychic 
motives,” to which one can ask: how did this thing 
come to my mind – what has led me to this? The 
fact that this question is possible characterizes 
any motivation in general. “Motives” are often 
hidden in depth but can be brought to light through 
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“psychoanalysis.” A thought “reminds me” of 
another thought, a vivid past comes to mind. In 
some cases, this link may even be noticed. But 
in most cases, although the motivation is actually 
present in the consciousness, it does not come to 
assume a relief, it is not noticed, it is inadvertent 
(“unconscious”).6 (Husserl, 1952, p. 223)
Conclusion
One of Machado’s greatest contributions to 
psychology and its history lies not only in the fact 
that in the nineteenth century he had a conception 
of the unconscious, but in how he articulated in his 
fiction the relation between consciousness, body, and 
unconsciousness.
As we could observe, the unconscious delineates 
itself and comes to life from the description of 
consciousness and the body. Thus, the unconscious 
is not an abstract, hidden and metaphysical entity. In 
a phenomenological interpretation, we can say that 
Machado presents a conception of unconsciousness that 
can easily be interpreted as a consciousness that does 
not express itself ref lectively. The experiences that 
constitute the pre-reflective life manifest themselves 
in the body, in the conduct, in the ways in which the 
person interprets and feels the several aspects of their 
surrounding world. The experiences participating in 
the stream of consciousness, are experienced by the 
individual, but are not always met by the I, themed 
as ref lexive acts of the spirit object. We have seen 
that Machado describes the psychic life to reveal 
that an unconscious emotion is not something that 
is absent from consciousness, but something that is 
present, although “misexpressed and misunderstood” 
(2004a, p. 363).
6 Given the importance of the passage to the developed argument, I quote in German: “Das einzelne darin ist im dunklen Untergrunde motiviert, hat seine 
„seelischen Gründe”, nach denen man fragen kann: wie komme ichdarauf, was hat mich dazu gebracht ? Daß man so fragen kann, charakte risiert alle Motivation 
überhaupt. Die „Motive” sind oft tief verborgen, aber durch „Psychoanalyse” zutage zu fördern. Ein Gedanke „erinnert” mich an andere Gedanken, ruft ein 
vergangenes Erlebnis in die E rinnerung zurück usw. In manchen Fällen kann das wahrgenommen werden. In den meisten Fällen aber ist die Motivation zwar 
im Bewußt sein wirklich vorhanden, aber sie kommt nicht zur Abhebung, sie ist unbemerkt oder unmerklich (‚unbewußt‘)”. (1952, p. 223)
A fenomenologia do inconsciente na obra de Machado de Assis 
Resumo: Neste artigo buscamos, em primeiro lugar, elucidar como Machado de Assis desenvolveu a concepção de inconsciente 
no romance Helena (1876) e no conto Uma senhora (1883). Em segundo lugar, examinamos como sua concepção de inconsciente 
pode ser elucidada fenomenologicamente, a partir da relação entre consciência reflexiva e pré-reflexiva. Nestas narrativas, 
Machado revela como certas emoções, embora não sejam apreendidas reflexivamente pelo sujeito que as vive, manifestam-se 
indiretamente nas ações, nas expressões corporais e no modo de compreender o mundo.
Palavras-chave: inconsciente, Machado de Assis, história da psicologia no Brasil, psicologia fenomenológica.
La phénoménologie de l’inconscient dans l’œuvre de Machado de Assis
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous examinons, d’abord, comprendre comment Machado de Assis a développé le concept de 
l’inconscient dans le roman Helena (1876) et le conte Uma Senhora (1883). En second lieu, nous cherchons à voir comment 
sa conception de l’inconscient peut être élucidée   phénoménologiquement, par la relation entre la conscience réfléchie et la 
pensée préréflexion. Dans ces récits, Machado révèle comment certaines émotions, bien que non appréhendées par le sujet qui 
les vit, se manifestent indirectement dans les actions, les expressions corporelles et la compréhension du monde.
Mots-clés: inconscient, Machado de Assis, histoire de la psychologie au Brésil, la psychologie phénoménologique.
La fenomenología del inconsciente en la obra de Machado de Assis 
Resumen: En este artículo buscamos, en primer lugar, mostrar cómo Machado de Assis desarrolló la concepción del inconsciente 
en la novela Helena (1876) y en el cuento Uma Senhora (1883). En segundo lugar, examinamos cómo su concepción del 
inconsciente puede ser elucidada fenomenológicamente, a partir de la relación entre la conciencia reflexiva y pre-reflexiva. En 
estas narraciones, Machado revela cómo ciertas emociones, aunque no reflexivamente aprehendidas por el sujeto que las vive, 
se manifiestan indirectamente en las acciones, en las expresiones corporales y en el modo de entender el mundo.
Palabras clave: inconsciente, Machado de Assis, historia de la psicología en Brasil, psicología fenomenológica.
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